The Research Seminar Series in Philosophy invites you to a seminar with Christian Löw, "Can Machines Be Conscious? On Chalmers's Fading Qualia Argument". The seminar is based on joint work with Madeleine Ribé.
Abstract: Would a machine that exactly replicates human cognitive functionality be conscious? David Chalmers argues that if consciousness is not determined by functional organization, there could be a person who is functionally identical to you yet has very different conscious states. Being functionally identical, this person has the same beliefs and makes the same utterances about her conscious life as you do. Yet, by assumption, her conscious states are different. Hence, she will be radically mistaken about her own consciousness. According to Chalmers, it is implausible that a functionally unimpaired person could be so disconnected from her own consciousness. So, he concludes that systems with the same functional organization must be equally conscious. In this talk, we argue that Chalmers’s thought experiment is unconvincing. The person in question either counts as functionally impaired or is aware of her consciousness after all.
All interested are welcome to participate in this seminar.
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