Högre seminariet i filosofi bjuder in till seminarium med Christian Löw. Seminariet har den engelska titeln "Can Machines Be Conscious? On Chalmers's Fading Qualia Argument" och baseras på arbete som Christian Löw gjort tillsammans med Madeleine Ribé.
Abstract (på engelska): Would a machine that exactly replicates human cognitive functionality be conscious? David Chalmers argues that if consciousness is not determined by functional organization, there could be a person who is functionally identical to you yet has very different conscious states. Being functionally identical, this person has the same beliefs and makes the same utterances about her conscious life as you do. Yet, by assumption, her conscious states are different. Hence, she will be radically mistaken about her own consciousness. According to Chalmers, it is implausible that a functionally unimpaired person could be so disconnected from her own consciousness. So, he concludes that systems with the same functional organization must be equally conscious. In this talk, we argue that Chalmers’s thought experiment is unconvincing. The person in question either counts as functionally impaired or is aware of her consciousness after all.
Observera att seminariet ges på engelska. Alla intresserade är välkomna att delta!
I Högre seminariet i filosofi ventileras avhandlingsavsnitt och annan forskning i filosofi.
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