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Personalbild Pär Sundström

Pär Sundström

+46 90 786 51 63

A, Humanisthuset, HE108 Umeå Universitet, 901 87 Umeå

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    My research focuses on consciousness, perception, colours (and other secondary qualities), concepts (or thinking abilities) and their acquisition, and cognitive development more generally. Here are some themes:

    - I think the qualities encountered in perception and sensation ("Galilean qualities" as I like to call them) are not parts of consciousness and that that is important for our understanding of consciousness ("Colour and consciousness" 2007; "A somewhat eliminativist proposal about phenomenal consciousness" 2008; "Two types of qualia theory" 2014; and work in progress).

    - I have traced some (unobvious) ways in which cognition is or may be independent of perception ("Lessons for Mary" 2004; "On imagism about phenomenal thought" 2011). But I think that there are some (also unobvious) ways in which cognition depends or can be based on perception ("Hume's missing shade of blue" (in Swedish] 2008; and work in progress).

    - Much of my work hovers around the mind-body problem. I find this problem hard, and have yet to come down on either side of the dualism-physicalism divide. I somewhat incline to the latter, but I think physicalism is not easily defended ("Review of Papineau" 2006; "Is the mystery an illusion?" 2008; "How physicalist can—and cannot—explain the seeming 'absurdity' of physicalism" forthcoming; and work in progress).

    - I think there is important truth in a classic, "descriptivist" idea that we can think about (many) things only "via their properties" (works in progress).

    - There are many, very different "transparency-of-experience" theses, and it is important to keep them apart ("Two types of qualia theory" 2014; "What is the transparency of experience and what follows from it?"(in Swedish 2015), "Visual experience" forthcoming).

    - I'm interested in arguments that what we experience, or directly experience in perception is a narrow range of properties and nothing particular ("Visual experience" forthcoming; and work in progress). I'm not sure whether one should accept the premises and therefore the conclusions of these arguments, or reject the conclusions and therefore some premise.

    - Every third day I believe that colours are visually complex ("Lessons for Mary" 2004; "Are colours visually complex" 2013).

     

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  • Latest publications

    2017
    Philosophy and phenomenological research
    Sundström, Pär
    2015
    Filosofisk Tidskrift, Bokforlaget Thales 2015, Vol. 36, (3)
    Sundström, Pär
    2014
    Harvard Review of Philosophy, Harward review of philosophy 2014, Vol. 20 : 107-131
    Sundström, Pär
    2013
    Johanssonian Investigations: Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2013 : 627-639
    Sundström, Pär
    2011
    Philosophical Review, Vol. 120, (1) : 43-95
    Sundström, Pär
    2011
    Philosophy Compass, Blackwell Publishing 2011, Vol. 6, (4) : 267-281
    Sundström, Pär
    2008
    Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences: Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium, The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society: Kirchberg am Wechsel 2008 : 340-342
    Sundström, Pär
    2008
    Filosofisk tidskrift, (3) : 18-33
    Sundström, Pär
    2008
    Synthese, Springer Netherlands 2008, Vol. 163, (2) : 133-143
    Sundström, Pär
    2007
    Philosophical Studies, Vol. 136 : 123-165
    Sundström, Pär
    2007
    Hommage à Wlodek: philosophical papers dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz
    Sundström, Pär
    2007
    Västerbottens-Kuriren, Västerbottens-Kuriren AB 2007, (2007-08-11)
    Sundström, Pär
    2005
    Sveriges television 2005
    Sundström, Pär
    2004
    Erfahrung und Analyse : Akten des 27. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 8. bis 14. August 2004, Kirchberg am Wechsel (Österreich) = Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Wien: The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 2004 : 367-9
    Sundström, Pär
    2002
    Physicalism, Consciousness and Modality: Essays in the Philosophy of Mind, Department of Philosophy and Linguistics, Umeå 2002 : 65-94
    Sundström, Pär
  • Research projects