The problem of consciousness: Philosophical and empirical aspects, 7.5 credits
Contents
The course is a specialisation in the philosophy of mind. It focuses on one aspect of our mental lives, namely consciousness, by which we here understand the "subjective" aspects of the mind, or "what it is like" to (say) feel pain or see colours. One topic that we consider is the ontological status of consciousness, and especially its relation to the brain. For example, can consciousness be identified with some brain process, or is the relation between consciousness and the brain of some other kind? Another topic concerns our epistemic access to consciousness: To what extent can we come to know and understand consciousness and its relation to the brain? The course covers both philosophical and empirical contributions to these issues.
Expected learning outcomes
Knowledge and understanding
- have good knowledge of and an overview of central concepts, theories, problems and arguments within the philosophy of consciousness;
- have in-depth knowledge within the sub-area of the philosophy of consciousness that deals with the subjective consciousness character of mental states;
- have an overview of current philosophical and empirical theories of consciousness
Skills and abilities
- be able to independently and critically discuss problems within the philosophy of consciousness.
Required Knowledge
90 ECTS credits in anthropology, computer science, linguistics, neuro science, philosophy, psychology or some other subject relevant to cognitive science, or similar. Proficiency in English equivalent to Swedish upper secondary course English 6/level 2. Where the language of instruction is Swedish, applicants must prove proficiency in Swedish to the level required for basic eligibility for higher studies.
Form of instruction
Lectures and seminars
Examination modes
The examination consists of written and oral assignments and active participation in seminars. On the course as a whole, the grades given are Fail (U), Pass (G), or Pass with Distinction (VG). In order to pass the course as a whole, all mandatory parts must be passed as well. The final grade of the course is a summary assessment of the results, and the course is passed only after all mandatory parts are passed.
A re-examination must be offered no later than two months after the regular exam, however, the re-examination must be offered no earlier than ten working days after the results of the regular exam have been announced and a copy of the students' exam is available. For tests conducted during the months of May and June, the first re-examination may be offered within three months of the regular test. In addition, at least one further re-examination must be offered within one year of the regular examination, so-called collection test. Those who have passed the exam may not undergo a new exam for a higher grade.
The examiner can decide on deviations from the examination form of the syllabus. Individual adaptation of the form of examination must be considered according to the student's needs. The form of examination is adapted within the framework of the curriculum's expected study results. Students who need an adapted examination must request adaptation from the institution responsible for the course no later than 10 working days before the examination. The examiner decides on an adapted examination, which is then notified to the student.
Other regulations
In the event that the syllabus expires or undergoes major changes, students are guaranteed at least three exams (including regular exams) according to the regulations in the syllabus on which the student was originally registered for a period of a maximum of two years from the previous syllabus expires or the course has been discontinued.
In granting a university degree, this course may not be combined with any other course that has a similar content. In case of uncertainty, the student should consult the Director of Studies at the Department of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies.
Literature
1 Introduction
The conscious mind
: in search of a fundamental theory
Chalmers David John
New York :
Oxford University Press :
1996 :
xvii, 414 p. :
ISBN: 9780198026532
Mandatory
Search the University Library catalogue
Reading instructions: Introduction + chapter 1. E-version available via UB
Vision Science: Photons to Phenomenology
Palmer Stephen
Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press :
1999 :
Mandatory
2 Metaphysical positions
The nature of mind
Armstrong David
Identity Theory, ed. C.V. Borst, London. McMillan :
1970 :
Online at:
Mandatory
Philosophical Papers Volume I
Lewis David K.
New York :
Oxford University Press :
1983 :
304 p. :
Table of Contents / Abstracts
Mandatory
3 Support for reductionism
Thinking about Consciousness
Papineau David
Oxford :
Oxford University Press :
2002 :
280 p. :
Table of Contents / Abstracts
ISBN: 9786612007071
Mandatory
Search the University Library catalogue
Reading instructions: Chapter 1 and appendix
Do we have free will
Libet Benjamin
Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 :
1999 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: p. 47-52
E-version available via UB
4 Challenges for reductionism
What Mary didn't know
Jackson Frank
Journal of Philosophy 83 :
1986 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: 291-5
E-version available via UB.
Naming and necessity
Kripke Saul A.
Cambridge, Mass. :
Harvard U. P. :
1980 :
172 s. :
ISBN: 0-674-59845-8
Mandatory
Search the University Library catalogue
Reading instructions: p. 144-55. Available online at http://socialistica.lenin.ru/analytic/txt/k/kripke_1.htm (in the online version, you can identify the passage as the one that begins with the sentence “I finally turn to an all too cursory discussion of the application of the foregoing considerations to the identity thesis" and ends at the end of lecture 3).
The conscious mind
: in search of a fundamental theory
Chalmers David John
New York :
Oxford University Press :
1996 :
xvii, 414 p. :
ISBN: 9780198026532
Mandatory
Search the University Library catalogue
Reading instructions: Section 2.2: “Reductive explanation"
5 Reductionist responses
What is it like to be a bat?
Nagel Thomas
Philosophical Review 83 :
1974 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: 435-50
E-version available via UB.
Can we solve the mind-body problem
McGinn Colin
Mind 98 :
1989 :
Mandatory
Ignorance and Imagination
: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness
Stoljar Daniel
New York :
Oxford University Press :
2006 :
288 p. :
Table of Contents / Abstracts
Mandatory
Thinking about Consciousness
Papineau David
Oxford :
Oxford University Press :
2002 :
280 p. :
Table of Contents / Abstracts
ISBN: 9786612007071
Mandatory
Search the University Library catalogue
Reading instructions: Section 2.1-2.6, and chapter 6
6 Illusionism
Illusionism as a theory of consciousness
Frankish K
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23 :
2016 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: (11-12), 11-39
7 Attention, Self and Consciousness
Selfless experience
Lee Geoffrey
Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1) :
2017 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: 207-243
Structuring mind: The nature of attention and how it shapes consciousness
Watzl S
Oxford University Press :
2017 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: The Perspectivity Picture, Ch 13 (pp. 259-283) In: Structuring mind: The nature of
attention and how it shapes consciousness.
Consciousness and no self?
Watzl S
Ratio, 31(4) :
2018 :
Online at:
Mandatory
Reading instructions: 363-375
Attention and Consciousness: A Comment on Watzl's Structuring the Mind
O´Conaill D
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy :
2019 :
Online at:
Mandatory
8 “Monitor" theories
A simple argument for a higher-order representation theory of consciousness
Lycan William
Analysis 61 :
2001 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: 3-4
E-version available via UB
Explaining consciousness
Rosenthal David
Philosophy of Mind, ed. Chalmers, Oxford UP :
2002 :
Online at:
Mandatory
Consciousness as internal monitoring
Lycan William
Philosophical Perspectives 9 :
1995 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: 1-14
E-version available via UB
Consciousness as internal monitoring
Lycan William
Philosophical Perspectives 9 :
1995 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: 1-14
E-version available via UB
Consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness: Two views and an argumen
Kriegel Uriah
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 :
2003 :
Online at:
Mandatory
Reading instructions: 103-32
The Division of Phenomenal Labor: A Problem for Representationalist Theories of Consciousness
Neander Karen
Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12) :
1998 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: 411-34
E-version available via UB
9 Measuring consciousness
Measuring consciousness: relating behavioural and neurophysiological approaches
Seth A.K, Dienes Z, Cleeremans A, Overgaard M, Pessoa L
Trends in cognitive sciences, 12(8) :
2008 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: pp 314-21
E-version available via UB
10 Neural correlates of consciousness
Experimental and theoretical approaches to conscious processing
Dehaene S, Changeux J
Neuron, 70 (2) :
2011 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: pp 200-227
E-version available via UB
Neural correlates of consciousness: progress and problems
Koch C, Massimini M, Boly M, Tonini G
Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 17(5) :
2016 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: pp 307-321
11 Representationalism/Intentionalism
The intrinsic quality of experience
Harman Gilbert
Philosophical Perspectives 4, ed. J. Tomberlin, Ridgeview :
1990 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: pp 31-52
E-version available via UB
Intentionalism defended
Byrne Alex
Philosophical Review 110 :
2001 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: pp 199-240
E-version available via UB
12 The structure of consciousness
“Some concepts of consciousness”
Block Ned
Philosophy of Mind, ed. Chalmers, Oxford UP :
2002 :
Online at:
Mandatory
Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory
Kriegel, Uriah
Oxford: Oxford UP :
2009 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: Sect. 1.3
E-version available via UB.
No watershed for overflow: Recent work on the richness of consciousness
Phillips Ian
Philosophical Psychology 29(2) :
2016 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: pp 236-49
E-version available via UB
1 Introduction
The conscious mind
: in search of a fundamental theory
Chalmers David John
New York :
Oxford University Press :
1996 :
xvii, 414 p. :
ISBN: 9780198026532
Mandatory
Search the University Library catalogue
Reading instructions: Introduction + chapter 1. E-version available via UB
Vision Science: Photons to Phenomenology
Palmer Stephen
Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press :
1999 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: Sections 13.2-13.3. Available in Cambro
2 Metaphysical positions
The nature of mind
Armstrong David
Identity Theory, ed. C.V. Borst, London. McMillan :
1970 :
Online at:
Mandatory
Philosophical Papers Volume I
Lewis David K.
New York :
Oxford University Press :
1983 :
304 p. :
Table of Contents / Abstracts
Mandatory
3 Support for reductionism
Thinking about Consciousness
Papineau David
Oxford :
Oxford University Press :
2002 :
280 p. :
Table of Contents / Abstracts
ISBN: 9786612007071
Mandatory
Search the University Library catalogue
Reading instructions: Chapter 1 and appendix
Do we have free will
Libet Benjamin
Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 :
1999 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: p. 47-52
E-version available via UB
4 Challenges for reductionism
What Mary didn't know
Jackson Frank
Journal of Philosophy 83 :
1986 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: 291-5
E-version available via UB.
Naming and necessity
Kripke Saul A.
Cambridge, Mass. :
Harvard U. P. :
1980 :
172 s. :
ISBN: 0-674-59845-8
Mandatory
Search the University Library catalogue
Reading instructions: p. 144-55. Available online at http://socialistica.lenin.ru/analytic/txt/k/kripke_1.htm (in the online version, you can identify the passage as the one that begins with the sentence “I finally turn to an all too cursory discussion of the application of the foregoing considerations to the identity thesis" and ends at the end of lecture 3).
The conscious mind
: in search of a fundamental theory
Chalmers David John
New York :
Oxford University Press :
1996 :
xvii, 414 p. :
ISBN: 9780198026532
Mandatory
Search the University Library catalogue
Reading instructions: Section 2.2: “Reductive explanation"
Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge
: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism
Alter Torin, Walter Sven
New York :
Oxford University Press :
2007 :
368 p. :
Table of Contents / Abstracts
Mandatory
5 Reductionist responses
What is it like to be a bat?
Nagel Thomas
Philosophical Review 83 :
1974 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: 435-50
E-version available via UB.
Can we solve the mind-body problem
McGinn Colin
Mind 98 :
1989 :
Mandatory
Ignorance and Imagination
: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness
Stoljar Daniel
New York :
Oxford University Press :
2006 :
288 p. :
Table of Contents / Abstracts
Mandatory
Physicalism and phenomenal concepts
Stoljar Daniel
Mind and Language 20 :
2005 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: p. 490-92.
E-version available via UB
Thinking about Consciousness
Papineau David
Oxford :
Oxford University Press :
2002 :
280 p. :
Table of Contents / Abstracts
ISBN: 9786612007071
Mandatory
Search the University Library catalogue
Reading instructions: Section 2.1-2.6, and chapter 6
6 Illusionism
Philosophy of mind
: classical and contemporary readings
Chalmers David John
New York :
Oxford University Press :
2002 :
675 s. :
ISBN: 0-19-514580-1 (hardback : alk. paper)
Mandatory
Search the University Library catalogue
Illusionism as a theory of consciousness
Frankish K
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23 :
2016 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: (11-12), 11-39
7 Attention, Self and Consciousness
Selfless experience
Lee Geoffrey
Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1) :
2017 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: 207-243
Structuring mind: The nature of attention and how it shapes consciousness
Watzl S
Oxford University Press :
2017 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: The Perspectivity Picture, Ch 13 (pp. 259-283) In: Structuring mind: The nature of
attention and how it shapes consciousness.
Consciousness and no self?
Watzl S
Ratio, 31(4) :
2018 :
Online at:
Mandatory
Reading instructions: 363-375
Attention and Consciousness: A Comment on Watzl's Structuring the Mind
O´Conaill D
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy :
2019 :
Online at:
Mandatory
8 “Monitor" theories
A simple argument for a higher-order representation theory of consciousness
Lycan William
Analysis 61 :
2001 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: 3-4
E-version available via UB
Explaining consciousness
Rosenthal David
Philosophy of Mind, ed. Chalmers, Oxford UP :
2002 :
Online at:
Mandatory
Consciousness as internal monitoring
Lycan William
Philosophical Perspectives 9 :
1995 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: 1-14
E-version available via UB
Consciousness as internal monitoring
Lycan William
Philosophical Perspectives 9 :
1995 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: 1-14
E-version available via UB
Consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness: Two views and an argumen
Kriegel Uriah
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 :
2003 :
Online at:
Mandatory
Reading instructions: 103-32
The Division of Phenomenal Labor: A Problem for Representationalist Theories of Consciousness
Neander Karen
Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12) :
1998 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: 411-34
E-version available via UB
9 Measuring consciousness
Measuring consciousness: relating behavioural and neurophysiological approaches
Seth A.K, Dienes Z, Cleeremans A, Overgaard M, Pessoa L
Trends in cognitive sciences, 12(8) :
2008 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: pp 314-21
E-version available via UB
10 Neural correlates of consciousness
Experimental and theoretical approaches to conscious processing
Dehaene S, Changeux J
Neuron, 70 (2) :
2011 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: pp 200-227
E-version available via UB
Neural correlates of consciousness: progress and problems
Koch C, Massimini M, Boly M, Tonini G
Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 17(5) :
2016 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: pp 307-321
11 Representationalism/Intentionalism
The intrinsic quality of experience
Harman Gilbert
Philosophical Perspectives 4, ed. J. Tomberlin, Ridgeview :
1990 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: pp 31-52
E-version available via UB
Intentionalism defended
Byrne Alex
Philosophical Review 110 :
2001 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: pp 199-240
E-version available via UB
12 The structure of consciousness
“Some concepts of consciousness”
Block Ned
Philosophy of Mind, ed. Chalmers, Oxford UP :
2002 :
Online at:
Mandatory
Purple Haze
Levine Joseph
Oxford UP :
2001 :
Mandatory
Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory
Kriegel, Uriah
Oxford: Oxford UP :
2009 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: Sect. 1.3
E-version available via UB.
No watershed for overflow: Recent work on the richness of consciousness
Phillips Ian
Philosophical Psychology 29(2) :
2016 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: pp 236-49
E-version available via UB