The problem of consciousness: Philosophical and empirical aspects, 7.5 credits
Contents
The course is a specialisation in the philosophy of mind. It focuses on one aspect of our mental lives, namely consciousness, by which we here understand the "subjective" aspects of the mind, or "what it is like" to (say) feel pain or see colours. One topic that we consider is the ontological status of consciousness, and especially its relation to the brain. For example, can consciousness be identified with some brain process, or is the relation between consciousness and the brain of some other kind? Another topic concerns our epistemic access to consciousness: To what extent can we come to know and understand consciousness and its relation to the brain? The course covers both philosophical and empirical contributions to these issues.
Required Knowledge
90 ECTS credits in anthropology, computer science, linguistics, neuro science, philosophy, psychology or some other subject relevant to cognitive science, or similar. Proficiency in English equivalent to Swedish upper secondary course English B/6. Where the language of instruction is Swedish, applicants must prove proficiency in Swedish to the level required for basic eligibility for higher studies.
Examination modes
The examination consists of writing assignments and active participation in seminars. On the course as a whole, the grades given are Fail (U), Pass (G), or Pass with Distinction (VG). In order to pass the course as a whole, all mandatory parts must be passed as well. The final grade of the course is a summary assessment of the results, and the course is passed only after all mandatory parts are passed.
Students who fail the examination have a right to retake the examination within two months after the first examination, and once again within a year. A student who has passed an examination may not be re-examined.
Students who have twice failed a test for a course or part of the course have the right to request from the Faculty director of studies at Faculty of Arts that a new examiner be appointed for future re-examination unless special reasons contradict this.
Deviations from the examination form of the syllabus can be made for a student who has decisions on pedagogical support due to disability. Individual adaptation of the examination form should be considered based on the student's needs. The examination form is adapted within the expected study results of the syllabus. At the request of the student, the teacher responsible for the course, in consultation with the examiner, must quickly decide on the adapted examination form. The decision should then be communicated to the student.
In the event that the syllabus expires or undergoes major changes, students are guaranteed at least three examination sessions (including the regular examination) according to the regulations of the syllabus on which the student was originally registered for a maximum period of two years from the end of the previous syllabus or the course has ceased to be offered.
Literature
Valid from: 2021 week 42
1 Introduction
Chalmers David John
The conscious mind
: in search of a fundamental theory
New York :
Oxford University Press :
1996 :
xvii, 414 p. :
ISBN: 9780198026532
Mandatory
Search the University Library catalogue
Reading instructions: Introduction + chapter 1. E-version available via UB
Palmer Stephen
Vision Science: Photons to Phenomenology
Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press :
1999 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: Sections 13.2-13.3. Available in Cambro
2 Metaphysical positions
Armstrong David
The nature of mind
Identity Theory, ed. C.V. Borst, London. McMillan :
1970 :
Online at:
Mandatory
Lewis David K.
Philosophical Papers Volume I
New York :
Oxford University Press :
1983 :
304 p. :
Table of Contents / Abstracts
Mandatory
3 Support for reductionism
Papineau David
Thinking about Consciousness
Oxford :
Oxford University Press :
2002 :
280 p. :
Table of Contents / Abstracts
ISBN: 9786612007071
Mandatory
Search the University Library catalogue
Reading instructions: Chapter 1 and appendix
Libet Benjamin
Do we have free will
Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 :
1999 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: p. 47-52
E-version available via UB
4 Challenges for reductionism
Jackson Frank
What Mary didn't know
Journal of Philosophy 83 :
1986 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: 291-5
E-version available via UB.
Kripke Saul A.
Naming and necessity
Cambridge, Mass. :
Harvard U. P. :
1980 :
172 s. :
ISBN: 0-674-59845-8
Mandatory
Search the University Library catalogue
Reading instructions: p. 144-55. Available online at http://socialistica.lenin.ru/analytic/txt/k/kripke_1.htm (in the online version, you can identify the passage as the one that begins with the sentence “I finally turn to an all too cursory discussion of the application of the foregoing considerations to the identity thesis" and ends at the end of lecture 3).
Chalmers David John
The conscious mind
: in search of a fundamental theory
New York :
Oxford University Press :
1996 :
xvii, 414 p. :
ISBN: 9780198026532
Mandatory
Search the University Library catalogue
Reading instructions: Section 2.2: “Reductive explanation"
Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge
: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism
Alter Torin, Walter Sven
New York :
Oxford University Press :
2007 :
368 p. :
Table of Contents / Abstracts
Mandatory
5 Reductionist responses
Nagel Thomas
What is it like to be a bat?
Philosophical Review 83 :
1974 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: 435-50
E-version available via UB.
McGinn Colin
Can we solve the mind-body problem
Mind 98 :
1989 :
Mandatory
Stoljar Daniel
Ignorance and Imagination
: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness
New York :
Oxford University Press :
2006 :
288 p. :
Table of Contents / Abstracts
Mandatory
Stoljar Daniel
Physicalism and phenomenal concepts
Mind and Language 20 :
2005 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: p. 490-92.
E-version available via UB
Papineau David
Thinking about Consciousness
Oxford :
Oxford University Press :
2002 :
280 p. :
Table of Contents / Abstracts
ISBN: 9786612007071
Mandatory
Search the University Library catalogue
Reading instructions: Section 2.1-2.6, and chapter 6
6 Illusionism
Chalmers David John
Philosophy of mind
: classical and contemporary readings
New York :
Oxford University Press :
2002 :
675 s. :
ISBN: 0-19-514580-1 (hardback : alk. paper)
Mandatory
Search the University Library catalogue
Frankish K
Illusionism as a theory of consciousness
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23 :
2016 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: (11-12), 11-39
7 Attention, Self and Consciousness
Lee Geoffrey
Selfless experience
Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1) :
2017 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: 207-243
Watzl S
Structuring mind: The nature of attention and how it shapes consciousness
Oxford University Press :
2017 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: The Perspectivity Picture, Ch 13 (pp. 259-283) In: Structuring mind: The nature of
attention and how it shapes consciousness.
Watzl S
Consciousness and no self?
Ratio, 31(4) :
2018 :
Online at:
Mandatory
Reading instructions: 363-375
O´Conaill D
Attention and Consciousness: A Comment on Watzl's Structuring the Mind
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy :
2019 :
Online at:
Mandatory
8 “Monitor" theories
Lycan William
A simple argument for a higher-order representation theory of consciousness
Analysis 61 :
2001 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: 3-4
E-version available via UB
Rosenthal David
Explaining consciousness
Philosophy of Mind, ed. Chalmers, Oxford UP :
2002 :
Online at:
Mandatory
Lycan William
Consciousness as internal monitoring
Philosophical Perspectives 9 :
1995 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: 1-14
E-version available via UB
Lycan William
Consciousness as internal monitoring
Philosophical Perspectives 9 :
1995 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: 1-14
E-version available via UB
Kriegel Uriah
Consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness: Two views and an argumen
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 :
2003 :
Online at:
Mandatory
Reading instructions: 103-32
Neander Karen
The Division of Phenomenal Labor: A Problem for Representationalist Theories of Consciousness
Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12) :
1998 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: 411-34
E-version available via UB
9 Measuring consciousness
Measuring consciousness: relating behavioural and neurophysiological approaches
Seth A.K, Dienes Z, Cleeremans A, Overgaard M, Pessoa L
Trends in cognitive sciences, 12(8) :
2008 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: pp 314-21
E-version available via UB
10 Neural correlates of consciousness
Experimental and theoretical approaches to conscious processing
Dehaene S, Changeux J
Neuron, 70 (2) :
2011 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: pp 200-227
E-version available via UB
Neural correlates of consciousness: progress and problems
Koch C, Massimini M, Boly M, Tonini G
Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 17(5) :
2016 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: pp 307-321
11 Representationalism/Intentionalism
Harman Gilbert
The intrinsic quality of experience
Philosophical Perspectives 4, ed. J. Tomberlin, Ridgeview :
1990 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: pp 31-52
E-version available via UB
Byrne Alex
Intentionalism defended
Philosophical Review 110 :
2001 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: pp 199-240
E-version available via UB
12 The structure of consciousness
Block Ned
“Some concepts of consciousness”
Philosophy of Mind, ed. Chalmers, Oxford UP :
2002 :
Online at:
Mandatory
Levine Joseph
Purple Haze
Oxford UP :
2001 :
Mandatory
Kriegel, Uriah
Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory
Oxford: Oxford UP :
2009 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: Sect. 1.3
E-version available via UB.
Phillips Ian
No watershed for overflow: Recent work on the richness of consciousness
Philosophical Psychology 29(2) :
2016 :
Mandatory
Reading instructions: pp 236-49
E-version available via UB