"False"
Skip to content
printicon
Main menu hidden.

The Burman Lectures 2023. Lecture 3: Epistemic Autonomy May Not Be a Thing

Wed
17
May
Time Wednesday 17 May, 2023 at 13:15 - 15:00
Place Hörsal HUM.D.210 (Hörsal E)

The Department of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies invites you to the annual Burman lectures in philosophy. This years invited lecturer is Professor David Enoch, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He will give three open lectures over three days on the theme of "Autonomy: Coercion, Nudging and the Epistemic Analogy". 

Professor David Enoch (Ph.D NYU) holds the Rodney Blackman Chair in the Philosophy of Law at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. He will later this year take up a position as Chair of Legal Philosophy at Oxford University. Professor Enoch is a prominent researcher primarily in moral philosophy, legal philosophy, and political philosophy. A central theme in Enoch's research has been to develop a defence of what he calls robust moral realism: i.e. that morality includes objective, universal moral truths that cannot be reduced to other kinds of facts. In political philosophy, he has tried to show that liberalism can accommodate insights derived from other political traditions of thought.

Learn more about Prof. David Enoch

Lecture 3: Epistemic Autonomy May Not Be a Thing

Wednesday May 17, 13.15-15.00, Hörsal HUM.D.210 (Hörsal E)

Abstract: In the practical domain, there are some decisions such that it’s more important that the agent make them herself than that they make the best decision. (Think, for instance, about choosing a romantic partner). In such cases, it seems like a rational agent may insist on making the decision themselves, fully recognizing that if they let someone else decide for them, the decision may be (otherwise) better. In the epistemic case, though, there doesn’t seem to be an analogue of this phenomenon. If I wonder whether p; it seems to me when I consider the first-order evidence that p; but I recognize that my chances of getting to a true belief regarding p are much higher if I rely on you instead; and you say that not-p – well, in such a case it seems a belief in p is never epistemically justified. This paper is my (tentative, and not systematic) attempt to think through this disanalogy and what it teaches us about autonomy in the practical and epistemic domains.

All interested are welcome to these lectures!

Learn more about the Burman Lectures

Learn more about Professor David Enoch

Event type: Lecture
Contact
Pär Sundström
Read about Pär Sundström