Högre seminariet i filosofi bjuder in till ett seminarium med Jessica Heine. Seminariet ges på engelska och har den engelska titeln "In Defense of a Modest Verificationism".
I’ll defend the thesis that all physical facts supervene on facts about how bits of the world perceptually seem from all possible perspectives, including unoccupied perspectives, which includes the perspectives of merely possible creatures. Historical “Verificationists” attempted to reduce truth to verification, a goal that—rightfully, in my opinion—has been generally dismissed as incoherent. However, I diagnose an overcorrection in the reaction to these movements. While sharing many core motivations, my thesis is much weaker than the historical, strong Verificationism in two key ways: First, my thesis merely seeks to restrict which contingent properties we can rationally postulate rather than which truth claims are coherent, thus avoiding self-undermining concerns. Second, this thesis is consistent with the notion that the facts I can express about the world go beyond the facts that I could in principle verify, even given infinite time and resources. According to my view, I can coherently postulate properties that I cannot directly verify via consideration of the sorts of creatures who might be able to verify such properties. However, the properties I represent in this way are of the same general metaphysical kind, discoverable in the same kind of way, as the properties I directly access via my own perception. Postulating such properties might be analogized to postulating unseen flowers on the other side of the mountain upon seeing flowers on my own side. As I directly access the ways the world phenomenally seems from my perspective, I can rationally understand that there are ways the world phenomenally seems from other perspectives, even as I lack direct acquaintance with such properties. In conceding this sense in which my ability to learn about the world can outstrip my direct experience—contrary to prominent, historical Verificationists—we needn’t accept the far stronger claim that we can learn about properties that go beyond not only our own perceptual experience, but all possible perceptual experience.
Alla intresserade är välkomna att delta i detta seminarium.
I Högre seminariet i filosofi ventileras avhandlingsavsnitt och annan forskning i filosofi.
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