Högre seminariet i filosofi bjuder in till ett seminarium med Pär Sundström. Seminariet ges på engelska och har den engelska titeln "What is low-level perception?".
By looking at an object, we can come to know all of the following: that it's yellow, that it has a certain shape, that it's a bicycle, and that it's expensive. But it's a natural thought that these properties -- being yellow, having a certain shape, being a bicycle, and being expensive -- are not on a par as far as vision is concerned. There are distinctions to draw here. Philosophers of perception and vision scientists have tended to concur with these thoughts. A relatively standard take goes as follows: we never perceive things as being expensive, even though we can come to know that things are expensive on the basis of perception; we sometimes perceive things as being bicycles but these perceptions are “high-level”; and we often perceive things as having certain colours and shapes and these perceptions are “low-level”. But what general accounts can one give of these distinctions? The focus of this talk is the distinction between low-level perception and not-low-level perception. I’ll discuss, and issue some reservations about, a “dependency view”, which says that perception is low-level iff it can be formed not on the basis of other perceptions. Then I’ll propose an “optical-sensitivity account”, which to a first approximation says that perception of a feature, formed in a certain way, is low-level iff the feature interacts with light in a unique way and the formation of the perception is sensitive to that unique way of interacting with light.
I Högre seminariet i filosofi ventileras avhandlingsavsnitt och annan forskning i filosofi.
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